

THE FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS

By HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

SHORTLY before the débâcle of the Greek army in Asia Minor I was discussing the question of war-weariness with several English friends at luncheon in a London club. Aware that good fortune had thrown me with men who knew—if any did—the state of the public mind in Great Britain, I was trying to find out whether the British would be ready to back by force of arms the French reparations demands upon Germany. My informants were unanimous in their belief that no government could lead the English people at the present time into a new war. "Not a chance in the world, any more than there is in your country," declared a Foreign Office man. "We know that so well that we got out of Ireland, compromised with Egypt, put up with a makeshift in Mesopotamia, stalled on the Zionist business in Palestine and are constantly warning the Government of India to avoid trouble internally and with Afghanistan."

"You mean that the people would not be behind you in support of traditional policies abroad, unless you could work them into feeling that pride and honor were involved."

"As for pride, we'd swallow a lot before we let the income tax go higher, and that honor business depends upon the press. Well, our press is as pacifist now as it was jingo a few years ago. We are not in a fire-eating mood. I do not think of any problem in international politics that could involve our people in war."



Wide World Photos

DEMONSTRATION IN SMYRNA FOR LLOYD GEORGE

Though Unofficially Backing the Greeks, the British Government Was Not Prepared to Support Their Cause Openly

"How about the question of the Straits?" I asked. "Oh, yes, the Straits, that's different," admitted my friend. "We should have to fight for the freedom of the Straits. No alternative there if the Greeks should lose out and the Turks should push us."

"Having been incited to push you," I commented.

"Having been incited to push us," he repeated gravely. And the others bowed assent.

This took me back to the previous week in Paris, when I had twice secured modifications of sweeping statements from men in the highest position by the same simple question. When one statesman told me that France would never extend the hand of fellowship to the Bolsheviks, I asked, "How about the Straits?" And when another statesman declared that France and Great Britain must and would see eye to eye in perfect solidarity "for the sake of the future of civilization", I asked, "How about the Straits?" In both instances there was the admission that reconciliation with Lenin and destruction of the *Entente* were lesser evils to France than seeing the English, either openly or indirectly through Greece as a tool, installed at Constantinople and, *ergo*, in control of the Straits.

Without going back into history farther than the Conference of San Remo in the spring of 1920, we can see that the determination of France to oust Great Britain from Constantinople and of Italy to prevent Greece from profiting by her intervention in the world war, has made strange political bed-fellows. The *Entente* alliance, has given Russia her chance to return to a place in the councils of the great powers, has made possible the repetition of massacres of Christians by the Turks, has jeopardized the advantages granted in the Treaty of Sèvres to the *Entente* Powers as well as to Greece and has created the dangerous precedent and example of one of the great states to whom a victors' treaty was dictated tearing up that treaty and turning the tables by dictating the terms of a new treaty to the erstwhile victors.

It is not too much to say that the quarrel among the *Entente* Powers over the disposition of the Straits has ended in robbing them of virtually all the spoils of their victory over the Central Empires and of damaging their prestige, and undermining still further their authority, in the Mahommedan world, already seriously impaired during the world war and the Peace Conference. The Conference of San Remo came to an understanding that saved the *Entente* from dissolution. But the failure of the three contracting parties—Great Britain, France and Italy—to live up to the San Remo Agreement and to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres has revealed a house divided against itself and has demonstrated the fact that treaties imposed upon the vanquished by force can be upset by force. When the *Entente* generals met the representatives of Kemal Pasha at Mudania on October 4, they were confronted with demands the acceptance of which meant the first step in the inevitable loss of all that had been gained by the world war. It was an hour of supreme danger when Ismet Pasha demanded the surrender of Constantinople before the terms of a new peace settlement in the Near East were arranged. And yet France dared to support this demand, which Great Britain and Italy opposed, risking everything on playing the card that would get the British out of Constantinople. Until Mr. Bonar Law wrote his remarkable letter to *The Times* on October 5, emphasizing the certainty of a British withdrawal from the Rhine if France backed the Turkish ultimatum at Mudania, it looked as if Great Britain were facing the alternative of yielding everything to Kemal Pasha or going to war.



A BAND OF PILGRIMS ON THE WAY TO A "MELA", OR RELIGIOUS GATHERING

Krishna Worship, with Its Doctrine of "Bhakti" or Loving Devotion to a Personal Deity, Makes a Deep Appeal to the People of India, with Whom Fasts, Pilgrimages and Other Religious Observances Are a Vital Part of Every-Day Living

idealized and universalized. . . . Sri Krishna is not only the Source and Substance of the lower emotions and instincts which rise through our contact and relations with Nature and the lower animal kingdom, but also of all the emotions that find play in our specific human relations. Krishna to the Vaishnava is thus Lord and Friend and Father and Son and Lover and Love. All our human relations are mere reflexes of these relations that exist in Sri Krishna Himself as part of His Own Being. He thus spiritualizes our physical activities and enjoyments. In his master the devout Vaishnava thus sees his Krishna. In his personal friend he realizes Krishna as friend. In his son and father, in his daughter or mother, he realizes and serves Krishna. In his conjugal life and relations he realizes and enjoys the highest, deepest love of Krishna. It is thus that in Hindu Vaishnavism we have a more thorough, more concrete, at once a more real and a more ideal presentation of the universal than perhaps we have in any other culture. In Vaishnavism the innate sense of the Spiritual and the Universal of the Indo-Aryan race-consciousness seems to have found its loftiest and deepest expression. If you want to visualize the Soul of India, you must seek and find it in Sri Krishna."

There is one further aspect of the religion of Sri Krishna as drawn from the *Gita* which deserves especial emphasis because it is so far removed from what we of the West usually consider Indian. The religions of India are commonly pictured as mystical and speculative; and certainly this description is a true one. But the chief aim of the *Gita*, which is perhaps the most precious bible of Hinduism, is to urge upon its readers the righteousness and the duty of action. "It is [only] these bodies that have an end; therefore fight, O thou of Bharata's race!" The logic here is the same as that at the close of St. Paul's great passage on the eternal life, in I Corinthians 15:58—"Wherefore [that is, since the spirit is immortal] be ye steadfast, unmovable, always abiding in the work of the Lord, inasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord." The follower of Krishna, like the follower of Christ, is urged to abide in the work of the Lord, just because one is living in a spiritual universe. The "work of the Lord", to be sure, does not mean the same thing in the

case that it means in the New Testament. It is not in particular the publication of the Gospel and the service of the needy. It means the specific kind of work which the Hindu *God* assigns to you on the basis of the particular place in society into which you are born. The one great duty of life for the Hindu, as for Plato, is to fit into one's special niche in the social whole. "Mind your own business," with the emphasis upon the positive, not the negative, side of this familiar saying, might be taken as the fundamental moral rule of Hinduism—a rule which is based, to be sure, upon an even more fundamental principle. "It is better," says Krishna in the *Gita*, "to do one's own work even without excellence than to do another's work well."

The great section of Hinduism which centers about Sri Krishna, as I have sought to indicate, has within it certain elements very primitive and a few aspects that are positively objectionable, mingled with much that is fairly lofty. Its most notable characteristic, however, is just this rich variety of content, with its resultant wide appeal, and the remarkable elasticity and adaptability that go with it. Whatever one may think of this form of religion, it is at any rate very much alive, and in the long centuries of its history it has proved itself peculiarly capable of growth. In this consists its great significance for the future of India. A faith that can transform the cowherd Krishna, decked out with all the puerilities of Mahaban and all the obscenities of Brindaban as described in the Puranas, into the lofty incarnation of the Supreme who speaks in the words of the *Gita* from the field of Kurukshetra—such a faith, even with its unworthy inheritances, may be looked to with considerable hope for further development. It is quite thinkable that such a faith, if it can steadily disentangle itself from its lower elements, may succeed in handing on to the India of the future the essentials of India's great spiritual past in a form increasingly adapted to the new needs of the new age. Sri Krishna himself seems to promise as much:

"For whensoever the Law fails and lawlessness uprises, then do I bring Myself to bodied birth.
"To guard the righteous, to destroy evil-doers, to establish the Law, I come into birth age after age."

Why does the triumph of their respective points of view in regard to the Straits seem of such vital importance to British and French statesmen that to it they are willing to sacrifice their friendship and alliance and the principles and war aims in the defense and furtherance of which they fought to a glorious and successful end the most stupendous and costly war of history? Both nations profess to be in favor of "the freedom of the Straits" and to have worked to avert "a more horrible war than we have yet known", as Lloyd George put it. But they have been acting towards one another more like enemies than friends, and their premiers, with the support of cabinets and the press, have advanced diametrically opposite opinions as to the best way to prevent the war they dread.


If the sorry mess in the Near East is settled without war, we shall be told that a dreadful calamity has only been postponed, and for this doubtful victory France will have paid the price of loss of British support in wringing money out of Germany, with the result that the reparations will hang on for a year or two longer and then be dropped from the realm of practical questions. If it leads to war, Great Britain fears the entry of Soviet Russia against her and uprisings in her Mahommedan possessions. The only prophecy we venture to risk is that the United States will not be able to stand aloof should the British Empire be hard pressed. Whatever may happen during the next few months in the Near East, then, the American is justified in wanting to know what this question of the Straits means and is lacking in foresight if he does not try to find out.

The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, so narrow that you can shoot an ordinary rifle from one continent to the other, so winding that at many places cannon can rake fore and aft as well as broadside a ship passing through them, afford the only outlet to the outside world for Bulgaria, Rumania, southern Russia, the Caucasus republics and some of the largest and richest *vilayets*, or provinces, of Turkey. For all Russia these waterways are the sole ice-free passage. They are the nearest and most practicable outlet for northern Persia and the khanates of Central Asia. A considerable portion of the wheat supply of many European countries comes in normal times from southern Russia, and Europe has learned to count upon the regular appearance on the market of the vast petroleum output of the Baku district of the Caucasus. The major portion of the trade of a region inhabited by one and a half times the population of the United States is carried through Black Sea ports. So important to the world's well-being was the free passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean considered before the world war

that Italy and the Balkan States, in their wars with Turkey, had to yield to the remonstrances of other nations and forego the advantage of bringing pressure to bear upon Turkey by attacking the Straits and maintaining a blockade of them.

Although the danger to the British Empire of the control of the Straits in time of war by an enemy Power was never given a practical demonstration during the nineteenth century, it was vividly enough imagined for the British to fight the Crimean War and to have been ready to fight on two other occasions signalized by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1833, and Treaty of San Stefano, 1878, to prevent other Powers than Turkey from dominating the Straits.

But a practical demonstration of this danger was given during the recent world war and is fresh enough in the minds of thinking Britons the world over to make them willing, however reluctantly, to fight again rather than allow what happened in 1914 to become possible again. The disastrous effects to the Entente Powers of Turkey's alliance with their enemies, which closed the Straits during four precious years, have not yet been fully measured. By handing over to Germany the control of the Straits the Young Turks are directly responsible for: (1) the length of the war; (2) the collapse of Russia; (3) the year of grace for the Bolshevik régime to get itself thoroughly established in Russia; (4) the menace to the Suez Canal during the war; (5) the unchecked spread of anti-British propaganda in northwest India, Afghanistan, Persia, Arabia and Egypt. The Dardanelles expedition, which was a holocaust for Australians and New Zealanders as well as



AKAIA

AOHNON




BYZANTINE "STONES" NEAR SEIDI GAZI

The Ruins of Ancient Hellas in Asia Minor Stirred the Hearts of Greek Soldiers with the Thought that They Were Fighting for Their Own People and Their Own Land

British. was entered upon and persisted in because the British... Constantinople. but also to

ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ



ΑΓΓΛΟΝ

the entry of the United States into the war. American credits and supplies, the moral effect of American intervention and the American contribution in man-power to the Entente armies on the Western Front in the spring and early summer of 1918 alone made possible the retention of British armies in Mesopotamia, Egypt and Macedonia. But to the wise man a menace successfully confronted is not a menace forgotten. The Islamic belt stretches around the Black Sea, across the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, across the Suez Canal. The British Empire is defended by the British fleet. If the fleet is powerless to exercise pressure upon the enemies of the empire in the interest and defense of the empire, the empire will crumble to pieces in short order.

Breathing a sigh of relief when the Armistice was signed, the British Foreign Office, aware of the vital importance of the Black Sea region to the future of British rule in Asia, sent troops not only to the Caucasus and to northern Mesopotamia, but also to the Persian Gulf. More brought to bear upon Afghanistan in 1919. Interpellations in Parliament on 9 March 1919 on Mesopotamian affairs, when the British Government was re-invested with the mandate for the occupation northward and eastward. of international Jewry were entered on the Asiatic side of the Suez Canal, it was realized that tax-wearying must be reckoned with. This Caucasus, Persia and Afghanistan to the undisputed influence of Soviet Russia, whose propaganda, however, it was planned to call off by trade agreements and the lifting of the economic blockade. The Mahomedan world, not being interested in trade and not being vitally vulnerable through any form of economic or food blockade, could best be watched and intimidated by a British fleet at Constantinople, holding Stamboul and the Sultan's palace of Dolma Bagicheh under its guns, with liberty to cruise in the Black Sea *ad libitum*. Since the taxpayers except without complaint the burden of maintaining the fleet, freedom of the Straits has been a boon to the British government in exercising pressure without spending too much money.

The Treaty of Sèvres is an excellent illustration of the vicious methods of world politics, which make agreements between nations unsound and insincere; unsound because they are not arrived at after a fair consideration of the issues at stake and because they



Ernestine Evans

GREETINGS FROM RUSSIA TO THE BOKHARA SOVIET

By Handing Over to Germany the Control of the Straits the Young Turks Have Been Responsible for the Unchecked Spread of Anti-British and Bolshevist Propaganda in Asia. Since the Armistice They Have Been in Close Touch with Soviet Russia

represent makeshift compromises; insincere because the contracting parties do not intend to keep them if contingent agreements—or rather bargains—are not lived up to. The British point of view prevailed in the Treaty of Sèvres. But Italy expected to gain from this concession British support against the Jugo-Slavs in the Adriatic, and France, British support for extreme measures against Germany in the reparations collection. Both nations looked to Great Britain either to forgive or to forget their indebtedness to her or at least to grant them the priority already acknowledged to Belgium in reparations payments. Before the ink was dry on the Treaty of Sèvres, France and Italy realized that the British could not be depended upon to help them out of their troubles political or financial in Europe, and the return of Constantine gave an excellent excuse to two of the three makers of the treaty not only to consider it null and void but actually to work against it. We must not lay too much stress upon the concessions features in the secret treaties negotiated by Italy and France with the Angora government. Considerations of foreign policy were paramount. Italy plotted the ruin of a potential commercial competitor in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. France, forgetful of her traditional rôle as protector of the Christians of the Orient and ignoring the alliance between Moscow and Angora, was bent on destroying the country she believed Great Britain had picked to hold Constantinople and the Straits as agent for British political and commercial interests. The unvarnished truth about the recent startling and sweeping change of fortunes in the Near East is simply this—the Nationalist Turks had the luck to be a good weapon to be used by two members of the Entente alliance to strike the third, and the Greeks had the misfortune to be lacking in endurance to play through to the end the game the British expected them to play, but alone, for the British government was not prepared to risk Mahommedan difficulties by coming out openly on the side of the Greeks.

At this juncture the reader may ask, "Why did the British

government seek a new champion for the Straits after having been champion of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire for a century, especially as Mahommedan susceptibilities had to be taken into account?" Great Britain certainly did not feel much about the Turks on the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus until after the Young Turk revolution. But the new régime had not been long installed before foreign observers began to see that the Young Turks were smitten with megalomania. They had an inordinate confidence in their own strength and in their ability to impose their cultural and political hegemony, in a constitutional state, upon the non-Turkish elements, Moslem as well as Christian. They provoked to rebellion Albanians and Arabs, alienated Circassians and Kurds and goaded the Balkan States to the desperate point where they were able to forget their own rivalries long enough to combine and drive the Turks out of Macedonia and Thrace. How could a British liberal government, relying upon the nonconformist vote, continue to aid the Turks in maintaining their domination over subject peoples who proved their ability to free themselves? After the first year of enthusiasm and generous impulse had ended in the horrible Adana massacre, the Young Turks were thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the electors to whom Messrs. Asquith and Lloyd George had to appeal in two bitterly contested general elections.

Turkey was so weakened by fruitless efforts to put down the rebellions among Mahommedan subject peoples that her new masters had foolishly provoked, and by the Young Turk policies in Tripoli and Macedonia, which were heading directly towards wars that could prove only disastrous, that her leaders unhesitatingly looked to Europe for some powerful ally. Abandoning the safe policy of Abdul Hamid of pitting one nation against another, the Young Turks deliberately chose Germany as their friend, put their army and the control of the Straits in Germany's hands a year before the world war broke out and during the months of August and September, 1914, so critical to the Entente Powers, fooled British and



A VILLAGE RECEPTION AT MUTALIS

Turkish Notables Greet Dr. Gibbons and Colonel Cordjas of the British Forces Division on the Front near Eskişehir

French by protestations of neutrality. As soon as the engineer officers of their German allies advised them that the Dardanelles could not be fortified by a fleet, they threw in their lot with the Central Powers. And during the four years since the Armistice the Turks have been in close touch with Soviet Russia and have assisted materially in the anti-British propaganda of the Bolsheviki in Asia.

The difference between the Young Turks and the old Turks is that the régime since 1908 purports to represent a people conscious of its nationhood and power, while the Hamidian régime was a system that had existed for centuries upon a threefold foundation: a theocratic absolutist government, centralized at Constantinople, for the Turkish element and other Mahommedan elements near the sea or in lowlands; virtual autonomy, on the principle of non-intervention or *laissez-faire*, for non-Turkish Mahommedan peoples of the mountains or hinterland; separate communities under their hierarchies for the Christian peoples of the empire. Old Turkey could be the enemy of no country except one that invaded her, and during the nineteenth century intervention of Europe was always invoked against an aggressor. Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic movement was a political one, with a limited appeal. The autocrat did not allow it to get out of hand. But ever since 1908 Great Britain has had to reckon with Turkey as a potential enemy, and ever since 1914 as an actual enemy. The Turks to the British are negligible as a military menace. The British at Chanak in September and October were not worried about Kemal Pasha's army. But the Turks as defenders of the cause of oppressed Mahommedan peoples against their Christian masters—that worries the British. And the Turks handing the key of the Straits to an enemy of Great Britain in time of war—that has happened once, and the British know that, if it is allowed to happen again, the death-knell of the British Empire may sound.

The freedom of the Straits, from the British point of view, means the insertion of guarantees in the peace settlement in the Near East of such a nature that the repetition of what happened in 1914 will be impossible. The Straits must be open to British war-ships in time of war as in time of peace—

open in such a way that nothing can close them. It is unnecessary to make any provisions concerning merchant ships. The British undertake to have a large enough fleet to look out for their merchant marine in war and peace.

What are these guarantees? First of all, prohibition of any form of fortification along the Straits or in the Sea of Marmora. Second, a neutral zone, the inviolability of which will be under the vigilant control of an international commission, on both sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Third, the absence of armies and armaments in the neutral zone. The principal difficulties arising in connection with the neutral zone, if the Turks get back Thrace and Constantinople, are: from the British side, getting, through limitation of armies and armaments in Thrace and Constantinople, the assurance that the neutral zone will not be violated suddenly, before the Powers can act to keep open the Straits; and from the Turkish side, being allowed by the

British to maintain armed forces and equipment—in Thrace sufficient to defend Thrace against a comeback of Greece, in Constantinople sufficient to police a large and rambling city on both banks of the Bosphorus. That the British must uphold as much as their demand for effective guarantees is beyond a doubt. When Mr. Lloyd George declared that never again should the Straits be closed against the British, his political opponents, except the Labor men, agreed that the French needed to be told bluntly that the Straits guarantees meant as much to the British as the Rhine guarantees meant to the French and that it was a case of *quid pro quo*. Great Britain's future policy towards German guarantees was going to be contingent upon France's policy now towards Turkish guarantees.

The British warning to France was heeded by Premier Poincaré. When Lord Curzon called at the *Quai d'Orsay* on October 6, he was informed that instructions had been sent to Constantinople for the French to agree with General Harington in rejecting the Kemalist demand that Eastern Thrace be turned over to Turkey immediately. But the attitude of M. Franklin-Bouillon, negotiator of the Angora treaty, at the Mudania Conference the previous day showed that what France really wanted was the return of Constantinople and Eastern Thrace to the Nationalist Turks without any serious or effective guarantees. This is not conjecture. For who does not recognize that if the Turks had entered Constantinople and had occupied Eastern Thrace before the peace treaty terms were agreed upon, let alone signed, the guarantees would never have been given? Especially when dealing with Turks, it would have been complete and abject surrender to grant all their demands before having made sure of the stipulations upon which granting the demands depended.

People are writing to me and telephoning me these days to ask why, if the French are so keen about the freedom of the Straits, they do not agree to go back to the provisions for this purpose in the Treaty of Sèvres, which, whatever we may say of its other solutions of moot questions, does provide here a reasonable system of guarantees, (Continued on page 1022)

THE FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS

(Continued from page 998)

worked out by commissions of able men who had studied the question for two years. And frequently there is this question: Are the French so stupid that they do not see how Turkey might be at Constantinople as powerless an agent of Russia as Greece would have been of Great Britain?

Now the French are not stupid—far from it. They are as a nation about as clear-headed a people as the world has ever known. They have a clarity of vision that Teutons and Anglo-Saxons do not possess. And if they seem more selfish and cynical and hard-hearted than we, it is only because they do not possess our comfortable faculty of fooling ourselves into believing that motives are mostly altruistic rather than selfish. The intellectual honesty of the French people shocks us when they apply it to their own actions: for we have never learned how to be honest with ourselves. To the Anglo-Saxon mind naked motives are like nude women: we know there are such things but our modesty clothes them!

The French look at the freedom of the Straits as something akin to the freedom of the seas. It is a comfortable formula without any meaning. For is not freedom that which one enjoys through the exercise of superior strength? And is it possible to enjoy freedom without rendering it to others? The seas are free to the British, and the affirmation of this freedom for themselves is the negation of it to others. For the British I can still presenting the French attitude would think that they had lost the freedom of the seas unless they were able to go where they pleased and do what their interests dictated in time of war. Now for the Straits. Although Italy is wholly and France partly and Great Britain not at all a Mediterranean Power, the one of the three possessing no littoral in the Mediterranean controls both entrances to it. The French and the Italians have never heard the British advocating the dismantling of Gibraltar and the application to the Suez Canal of the Sèvres Treaty provisions for the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. From the point of view of her allies, what does Great Britain mean by the freedom of the Straits? They believe that she conspired with the Greeks to close the Straits, a move that necessitated drastic countermoves. And now that these countermoves have succeeded, why all this great fuss over neutral zones? At the bottom of it—*au fond*, as the French love to say in summarizing the discussion of a problem or an argument—what the British want is immunity for their fleet from the inconvenience created by nature to a free entrance to and exit from the Black Sea. Once this immunity is granted them, they will be in a position, owing to their naval superiority, to make it of no value to any other nation. By the treaty negotiated at Washington, France and Italy were asked to agree to a naval ratio of 1.75-1.75 each in proportion to Britain's 5. Together they were asked to accept 3.5 to Britain's 5. As long as this

naval proportion holds by treaty, the freedom of the Straits is valuable only for Great Britain and the United States.

Let us take a concrete illustration. Let us say that the treaty settlement does have guarantees that are effective, that the neutral zone is established and controlled and that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are without fortifications. The British fleet is able to pass at will from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and vice versa. Its cruising radius, hence its power, is extended to the vast Black Sea regions. But does that freedom work out the same way for Russia and France and Italy? The Straits are free, yes, but the mistress of the seas—for that very reason—would be able to attack the Russians in their own waters, and then, backed up against the "free" Straits, oppose at either end to any comer, except the United States, a floating barrier of fortifications more powerful than any that ever could be erected at the mouth of the Bosphorus on the Black Sea or the mouth of the Dardanelles on the Aegean Sea.

One objects that we must consider the good faith of England, and the Anglophile declares that England never abuses her power and that her word is as good as her bond. Yes, that is a powerful argument for us Americans—*provided* we have our 5-5 ratio. It was a powerful argument before, but it is not so now. The trade nor political roads with our friends across the sea. But we must get into our heads in considering European international politics that the French and Italians and Russians do not look upon the British as most of us do. The British are a potential enemy. History has demonstrated that nations change alliances bewilderingly. The foreign policy of France—and of Italy—in the Near East always takes into consideration the superiority of the British fleet and the possession by Great Britain of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal and Malta. Whatever steps can be taken to lessen the menace of British sea power—or at least to prevent its becoming a greater menace—are justifiable and worth risking much for. Since they do not believe Bolshevism will last forever, French and Italians look upon the ascendancy of Russian influence in Constantinople as less of a danger in war and far, far less of a stumbling-block to commerce in peace than British control there.

Since Italy has got over her fear of an internal Bolshevik movement and since France has become convinced that Poland will never replace her old Muscovite ally as the "guardian of civilization against German barbarism" on the eastern marches, there has been a marked tendency in Rome and Paris to talk about the obligations of the Entente secret treaty of 1915. The French, especially, are apprehensive of the moment when a regenerated—but thoroughly nationalistic—Russia, upon whom France will be able to depend far more than upon Great Britain and the United States for aid against a German comeback, will ask how her friends looked after her interests abroad during the years of misfortune and humiliation. They want to be able to say that they have prevented Great Britain from corraling Con-

(Continued on page 1025)


THE FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS

(Continued from page 1023)

stantinople. It might not have been possible to consider Constantinople in Greek hands as a tempting morsel to bait the imperialistic ambitions of convalescent Russia. With an international neutral zone established and the freedom of the Straits guaranteed, the new Russia, although realizing even more bitterly than the two Mediterranean Powers the exclusive advantage of this régime to Great Britain, would have her hands tied and would owe nothing but resentment to France. With the Turks back, on both sides of the Straits, France can make a secret treaty with Russia by which Turkey will follow Greece as a sacrifice to the exigencies, to the superior interests, of European Powers. Why not? France has much less reason to feel affection for or obligation towards Turkey than towards Greece. Greece was trussed and delivered up as a victim to Kemal Pasha. If ever betrayal of the Turks is the price of winning back Russia in an offensive and defensive alliance against Germany, who would be foolish enough to protest on the score of honor?

This has not been a presentation of the side or the other in the great question of the hour, upon which the peace of the world may hang. I hold no brief for British or French, for Italian or Russian, for Turk or Greek. I have tried not to wander into by-paths, but to present the facts concerning the Straits. It is true that these facts present a sorry picture of international morality. (But is it not important for us to analyze the motives actuating the principals in this stupendous diplomatic battle? For only in this way shall we come to understand how futile would be the solution proposed glibly, i.e., that the League of Nations control the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. For, from the world point of view, there is no separate problem called "the question of the Straits", unless we decapitalize "Straits" and cut out the definite article. There is a question of straits, by which we mean all international waterways. The League of Nations can rightly be suspected of being an agent of particular interests, plotting to the advantage of some nations against others, until its champions are able to convince themselves and public opinion in the nations whose representatives sit on the Council of the League, that the League can exist and function only as an instrument of impartial administration and justice.

If the United States is willing to give up the Panama Canal to the League and Great Britain is willing to give up Gibraltar and the Suez Canal to the League, we have the right to criticize French and Italian policy on the Bosphorus, on the ground that these Powers have less faith in the League than we have. But by what right do we expect these two Powers to entrust their interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea to the League of Nations when we have neither given the example nor will promise to follow it? And what can we possibly find to say to Russia or Turkey, the countries most interested?



Effective Green At

WHEN Mr. house and particular thing to do. So then I do it. Wonder if you know thought about h garage?

Here is a suggest its Eastern and S back its size an for the greenhot have on the East

We will promptly greenhouse and s look.

As for its cost ou

Hitch

Home Of

New York
101 Park Avenue 61

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION OF
August

ASIA, The American

Published monthly at Con

State of New York, County of New York, ss.
Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and co been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that I and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above captioned Postal Laws and Regulations, to wit: 1. That the names of the managers are: Publisher, J. D. Froelich, 627 Lexington Ave Lexington Avenue, New York City; Business Manager, New Lexington Avenue, New York City; Estate of Willard Straig mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 p are: Estate of Willard Straig, 120 Broadway, New York the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain upon the books of the company, but also, in cases where the as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing tions under which stockholders and security holders who do securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide own association, or corporation has any interest direct or indirect it

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 11th day of October (My commission expires March 30, 1924.)

XAPTAI

71101-1
"ASIA"
N.Y.
Aug. 1922





Illustration for "The Freedom of the Straits", page 994

ZONE OF STRAITS AS DEFINED BY SEVRES TREATY AND LATER ALLIED AGREEMENTS

Upper Map Shows Allied and Turkish Forces After Capture of Smyrna and During Mudania Conference. Statements of Relative Strength Are Official. Lower Map Gives Overlapping Fields of Fire and Range of Guns on British Fleet, Anchored or Cruising Outside Straits, in Opposing Turkish Invasion of Thrace Through Neutral Zones. These Zones, Existing Against Turkey, Were Also, May, 1921, Declared Neutral Against Greco-Nationalist Operations