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attack on Chocolate Hill, and partly to the south in search of water, carrying and accompanying the wounded to the rear, and so on. We have, in fact, reason to believe that a considerable number of stragglers had collected at or near the shore.

On August 8, Sir Frederick Stopford was anxious to push on, but the divisional commanders doubted the possibility of further advance that day, as the troops were exhausted by continuous fighting and lack of water. It was therefore decided to attack Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta Sagir Ridge at dawn of August 9. There was a shortage of artillery and Sir Frederick Stopford was opposed to frontal attacks, but desired the troops to push on as far as possible and to turn any trenches that were met with.

In his dispatch of December 11, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton criticized Sir Frederick Stopford for delay at this period, but the Commission thought that there was a misunderstanding, and that, as a result of it, Sir Ian Hamilton so worded his criticism "as to obscure Sir Frederick Stopford's specific intention and injunction that the troops should push on as far as possible."

There is little doubt that the low trajectory of the naval guns was ineffective against deep trenches.

### SIR I. HAMILTON'S INTERVENTION.

On the afternoon of August 8 Sir Ian Hamilton, dissatisfied with the progress of the operations, proceeded from Imbros to Suvla. On arrival he appears to have altered the orders for the projected attack. He decided that, since the 32nd Brigade was concentrated and ready to move, the attack should begin at the earliest possible moment. He also directed that this brigade should endeavour to occupy the heights north of Anafarta Sagir. In his dispatch he speaks of the 13 battalions detailed for the attack, but the correct number appears to be 11—namely, four battalions of the 33rd Brigade, together with one from the 31st Brigade, on the right, with Ismail Oglu Tepe as the objective; four battalions of the 32nd Brigade on the left, with Anafarta Sagir as the objective; and two battalions of the 34th Brigade in reserve. Sir Ian Hamilton in his plans and dispositions for the attack at dawn on the 9th, he repudiated any responsibility for the results of the action.

The 32nd Brigade received instructions to concentrate at Sulajik, and thence to occupy the high ground at Tekke Tepe, but the concentration was not successful. At 3.30 a.m. on the 9th one battalion supported by a second was sent on. At a point 1,000 yards south of Tekke Tepe the head of the column was attacked by a superior force of Turks, and both battalions were compelled to retire after suffering heavy loss.

Three battalions of the 33rd Brigade, with two battalions from General Hill's force, attempted, about 4.45 a.m. on the 9th, the attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe, and on the ridge running thence to Anafarta Sagir. A heavy rifle fire opened from the direction of Alrikju and from Chocolate Hill. Hill 70 proved to be occupied by Turks instead of by our troops, as was expected. The centre battalion was enfiladed from this point and attacked at close quarters. The attack was brought to a standstill, and it became a question of holding on at all costs.

During the night of the 8th and morning of the 9th the 53rd Division had landed at Suvla. It was distributed in support near Chocolate Hill and Hill 10. During the 9th desultory fighting continued, and at nightfall the distribution of the troops was as follows:—

The 9th Sherwood Foresters and 1/1 Hereford Regiment near Hetman Chair.

Five battalions of the 10th Division under General Hill, with one field and one mountain battery on Chocolate Hill and Hill 50.

The 33rd Brigade, less the 8th Sherwood Foresters, plus two battalions of the 160th Brigade, under General Maxwell, from Hill 50 to the vicinity of Sulajik.

The 32nd Brigade, less one battalion, plus two battalions of the 159th Brigade at and to the north of Sulajik.

Two battalions of the 34th Brigade, with one battalion of the 32nd Brigade, further to the north.

The remaining two battalions of the 34th Brigade at point 28, west of Kuchuk Anafarta Ova under the

and trench a line across the whole front extending from Anzak Dere on the south, through the knoll east of Chocolate Hill, to the ground held by the 10th Division on Kiretch Tepe Sirt. The entrenchment of the line from Kazlar Chair to 600 yards south of Sulajik was assigned to the 11th Division, thence to the west of Kuchuk Anafarta Ova to the 53rd Division, and thence to Kiretch Tepe Sirt to the 10th Division. The length of this line was over five miles.

On August 10 the 54th Division landed at Suvla Bay. On August 12 General Headquarters ordered this division to attack the heights at Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe, and thence to Anafarta Sagir, marching that night and attacking at dawn on the 13th. On the afternoon of the 12th the 163rd Brigade was sent forward to occupy Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, since Sir Frederick Stopford believed that the ground eastward of this place was held by the enemy. In spite of strong opposition from the Turks this manoeuvre was successfully accomplished.

On the same day general headquarters inquired from Sir Frederick Stopford as to whether the 54th Division could, if they succeeded in gaining the high ground of their objectives, be supplied with food, water, and ammunition. Sir Frederick replied that he foresaw grave difficulty. Thereupon the orders for the night march at the attack on the heights were cancelled.

### CHANGE OF COMMAND.

On August 15 an attempt was made to straighten the line by capturing Kiretch Tepe Sirt. At first it was successful, the 6th Dublin Fusiliers capturing the top of the ridge, but after severe fighting and heavy casualties the troops had to fall back. On the same date Sir Frederick Stopford was relieved of his command and succeeded by Major-General de Lisle. At the request of the new commander the 29th Division was brought from Helles to Suvla on August 20. The second mounted Division had landed two days before.

An important attack was planned for August 21. The 53rd and 54th Divisions were to hold the enemy from Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt. The 11th Division on the right and the 29th Division on the left were to attack Ismail Oglu Tepe the ridge towards Anafarta Sagir. In support the 2nd Mounted Division and the remains of the 10th Division. It was arranged with Sir William Birdwood at Anzac that a force of nine battalions should cooperate by advancing from Damskjelik Bair so as to connect with the southern end of the outpost line of the 9th Corps near Kazlar Chair. It had been decided to attack in the afternoon, and it so happened that a fog came on which seriously interfered with the preliminary bombardment of the enemy's position from 2.30 p.m. to 3 p.m. The advance was begun at 3 p.m. by the 11th Division, the 34th Brigade rushing the Turkish trenches between Hetman Chair and Aire Kevak.

So far as the 11th Division was concerned the operation failed. As regards the 29th Division, the 87th Brigade on the left succeeded in carrying the trenches on Hill 70, but a bush fire brought the 86th to a standstill and eventually the whole division withdrew to its former position. Later efforts secured no greater success. On the right a lodgment was effected at Kaiajak Aghale, and a line from that place northward to Susak Kuyu was taken up and subsequently connected with the right of the 9th Corps. The casualties in the 9th Corps on August 21 were approximately as follows:— In the 11th Division, 58 out of 129 officers and 2,306 other ranks out of 6,400. In the 29th Division a little under 5,000 officers and men. In the 2nd Mounted Division, which was about 4,000 strong, 1,200 officers and men, or 30 per cent. The failure of August 21 was attributed by General de Lisle mainly to want of artillery. It was the last great attempt to achieve success at Suvla Bay. The Commission state that the fighting after General de Lisle replaced Sir Frederick Stopford was really of a defensive character.

On August 27 the Dardanelles Committee,