

# ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑ ΤΗΣ ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑΣ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ

ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑ ΣΥΝΕΔΡΙΑ ΤΗΣ 10<sup>ΗΣ</sup> ΜΑΪΟΥ 2005

ΥΠΟΔΟΧΗ  
ΤΟΥ ΑΝΤΕΠΙΣΤΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ ΜΕΛΟΥΣ  
κ. CARL JOACHIM CLASSEN

ΠΡΟΣΦΩΝΗΣΗ ΓΙΟ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΟΥ κ. EMMANOÏΛΑ ΡΟΥΚΟΥΝΑ

Με ιδιαίτερη χαρά ἡ Ἀκαδημία Ἀθηνῶν ὑποδέχεται σήμερα τὸν καθηγητὴ κ. Carl Joachim Classen, ἓνα ἀπὸ τοὺς πλέον διακεκριμένους διδασκάλους καὶ ἐρευνητὲς τῶν κλασσικῶν γραμμάτων.

Ὁ καθηγητὴς Classen ἔχει ἀσχοληθεῖ μὲ διεισδυτικότητα καὶ τάλαντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τρόπον χαρίεντα μὲ πλήθος θεμάτων τῆς κλασσικῆς φιλολογίας καὶ λογοτεχνίας. Ἀνέλυσε ἔννοιες καὶ ἀντιλήψεις τῆς ἐλληνικῆς καὶ τῆς ρωμαϊκῆς γραμματείας, ἐξέτασε τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς ἀρχαίας λογοτεχνίας ποὺ ἐπηρέασαν τὸ ἀνθρωπιστικὸ κίνημα στὸν 15ο καὶ τὸν 16ο αἰῶνα καὶ εἶναι ὁ ἀναγνωρισμένος εἰδήμων τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς ρητορικῆς ἀπὸ τοὺς ἀρχαίους χρόνους ἕως σήμερα. Ἐδίδαξε καὶ διδάσκει σὲ μεγάλα πανεπιστημιακὰ ἰδρύματα τῆς πατρίδας του Γερμανίας καὶ ἄλλων χωρῶν τῆς δυτικῆς καὶ τῆς ἀνατολικῆς Εὐρώπης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἀμερικῆς καὶ τῆς Κίνας.

Ἡ ἐντυπωσιακὴ πορεία τοῦ καθηγητοῦ Classen ἐνίσχυσε τὴ μελέτη τῶν κλασσικῶν γραμμάτων παγκοσμίως καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι ἓνας ἐπιπλέον λόγος γιὰ τὸν ὁποῖο ἡ Ἀκαδημία ἀποφάσισε νὰ περιλάβει αὐτὴ τὴν ξεχωριστὴ πνευματικὴ φύση γνῶμιά μεταξὺ τῶν ἀντεπιστελλόντων μελῶν τῆς.

Dear Colleague,

The Academy of Athens is honoring your outstanding scholarship and

your significant contribution to the enhancement and the dissemination of classical studies. The Academy has elected you as a correspondent member and I am pleased to offer you the insignia of this distinction.

I wish you all the best in the continuation of your achievements.

ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑΣΗ ΓΙΝΟ ΤΟΥ ΑΚΑΔΗΜΑΪΚΟΥ κ. ΝΙΚΟΛΑΟΥ ΚΟΝΟΜΗ

Ο καθηγητής κ. Classen γεννήθηκε στο Άμβουργο το 1928. Η οικογένειά του είχε στενό δεσμό με τα κλασσικά γράμματα, καθώς ο προπάππος του, γνωστός σχολάρχης, ήταν μαζί με τον Steup οι συγγραφείς ενός σχολιαστικού υπομνήματος στον Θουκυδίδη, που το χρησιμοποιούσαμε ως φοιτητές. Τήν πανεπιστημιακή του εκπαίδευση συμπλήρωσε στα Πανεπιστήμια του Άμβουργου, της Γοτίγγης και της Όξφόρδης. Το 1956 απέκτησε στην Όξφόρδη τον τίτλο του B. Litt. και το 1961 έγινε ύφηγητής στη Γοτίγγη. Το 1987 του άπενεμήθη ο τίτλος D. Litt στην Όξφόρδη και το 2000 ο τίτλος του επίτιμου διδάκτορα του Πανεπιστημίου του Tartu.

Το διδακτικό του έργο άρχισε ως ύφηγητής των Κλασσικών Σπουδών στο Πανεπιστήμιο του Ibadan 1953-59· ύφηγητής στο Πανεπιστήμιο της Γοτίγγης 1960-66· καθηγητής Κλασσικής Φιλολογίας στο Τεχνικό Πανεπιστήμιο του Βερολίνου 1966-69, στο Würzburg 1969-73 και στη Γοτίγγη 1973-1993, όποτε συνταξιοδοτήθηκε. Ως επισκέπτης καθηγητής δίδαξε στην Τυβίγγη 1964-65· στο Πανεπιστήμιο του Texas (στο Austin) 1967-68· στο Changchun της Κίνας 1992 και έκτοτε έγινε μόνιμος επισκέπτης καθηγητής στο Tartu της Έσθονίας 1994 και 1996· στο Πανεπιστήμιο III της Ρώμης το 1995, στο Roma I (Sapienza) το 1997· ήταν επισκέπτης του Institute for Advanced Study στο Princeton 1975, του Κολλεγίου All Souls της Όξφόρδης το 1980 και του Κολλεγίου Merton της Όξφόρδης το 1995.

Ο καθηγ. Classen είναι μέλος της Ακαδημίας Επιστημών της Γοτίγγης· ξένο μέλος της Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere e belle Arti της Νεάπολης, της Mommsen-Gesellschaft (πρόεδρος 1983-87)· της Fédération internationale des Associations d'Études Classiques (πρόεδρος 1997-2002)· της International Society for the History of Rhetoric (πρόεδρος 1987-89)· της Classical Association και της American Philological Association και επίτιμο μέλος της Πολωνικής Φιλολογικής Έταιρείας. Ο κ. Classen είναι συνεχδότης των

ἐπιστημονικῶν ἐντύπων: *Museum Africum* (1972-85), *German Studies Section I και III* (1976-91), *Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft* (ἀπὸ τὸ 1976), *Rhetorica* (1983-92), τοῦ *Gnomon* (ἀπὸ τὸ 1988), τοῦ *Voces* (ἀπὸ τὸ 1990), τοῦ *Catalogus Commentariorum et Translationum* (ἀπὸ τὸ 1993), τοῦ *Emerita* (ἀπὸ τὸ 2002).

Ὁ καθηγ. Classen ἔχει δημοσιεύσει περίπου 110 ἄρθρα καὶ περισσότερες ἀπὸ 200 βιβλιοκρισίες. Ἔχει ἐπίσης ἐπιμεληθεῖ μόνος ἢ μὲ ἄλλον τὴν ἔκδοση ἐννέα βιβλίων. Τὸ 1999 ἐκδόθηκε πρὸς τιμὴν τοῦ ἀπὸ συναδέλφους καὶ μαθητῆς τοῦ τὸ ἀφιέρωμα *Antike Rhetorik und ihre Rezeption*, Stuttgart 1999.

Σύντομη ἀνάλυση τῶν βιβλίων τοῦ καθηγητῆ C. J. Classen:

1) *Untersuchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern*, δ.δ., Ἀμβούργο 1951 / Βερολίνο 1960. Ἡ διατριβὴ δημοσιεύτηκε λόγῳ τῶν μεταπολεμικῶν συνθηκῶν τῆς Γερμανίας σὲ συντομευμένη μορφή καὶ εἶναι ἀφιερωμένη στὶς κυνηγετικὰς μεταφορὰς τῆς ἑλληνικῆς λογοτεχνίας ἀπὸ τὸν Ὅμηρο ὡς τὸν Πλάτωνα, μὲ ἰδιαίτερη ἐμφάση στὸν Πλάτωνα. Τὸ πρῶτο μέρος ἀσχολεῖται μὲ τὶς παρομοιώσεις καὶ συγκρίσεις στὸν Ὅμηρο, τοὺς λυρικοὺς ποιητῆς, τὸν Πίνδαρο, τοὺς δραματικοὺς ποιητῆς καὶ τὸν ἀττικὸ πεζὸ λόγῳ, ἐκτὸς ἀπὸ τὸν Πλάτωνα. Δείχνει τὸν ἰδιαίτερο τρόπο πὺλ χρησιμοποίησαν οἱ ἐπικοὶ ποιητῆς εἰδικὰς πλευρὰς τοῦ κυνηγίου, τὴ νέα κατανόηση ἀπὸ τοὺς λυρικοὺς ποιητῆς τῆς διαδικασίας τοῦ κυνηγίου καὶ τὴ χρησιμοποίησή της σὲ σχέση μὲ τὸν ἔρωτα, τὰ νέα στοιχεῖα στὴν πινδαρικὴ γλῶσση καὶ τὰ μοτίβα κυνηγίου πὺλ παρουσιάζουν οἱ δραματικοὶ ποιητῆς γιὰ ἔρωτα, ἐκδίκηση, πόλεμο ἢ πνευματικὴ ἀναζήτηση. Τὸ δεῦτερο μέρος, πὺλ εἶναι ἀφιερωμένο στὸν Πλάτωνα, ἀσχολεῖται συνοπτικὰ μὲ παραδοσιακὰς χρήσεις καὶ κυρίως μὲ τὶς διάφορες μεταφορὰς στὸ φιλοσοφικὸ διάλογο, καὶ δείχνει τί ἀποκαλύπτουν οἱ μεταφορὰς γιὰ τὴν κατανόηση κεντρικῶν ἀπόψεων τῆς διαλεκτικῆς πορείας τοῦ Πλάτωνος.

2) *Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens*, Μόναχο 1959.

Τὸ βιβλίο ἀσχολεῖται ἐπίσης μὲ τὴ γλῶσση τοῦ Πλάτωνος, τὸν τρόπο πὺλ ὁ ἴδιος ἢ οἱ συνομιλητῆς τοῦ ἐπιμένουν στὴν ἀρχικὴ σημασία τῶν λέξεων, ἀποκαλύπτοντας τὴ σύμφυτη σημασία τους. Ἰδιαίτερα ἀσχολεῖται μὲ ὀρισμένους ὅρους πὺλ ἔχουν μεγάλη σημασία γιὰ τὴ φιλοσοφία τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ ἀπ' ὅπου ἀντλεῖ βασικὰς ἰδέες, π.χ. τὴν ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀνάπτυξη τῆς ἰδέας τῆς τριμεροῦς ψυχῆς (καὶ τὸ παράλληλο τῆς πολιτείας) ἢ τὴ σχετικότητα τῶν μεταφορῶν τῆς ὅρα-



σης για την ανάπτυξη της θεωρίας των ιδεών ή την επανερμηνεία λέξεων, όπως υπόθεσις ή διαίρεσις και άλλους τεχνικούς όρους του Πλάτωνος και Σωκράτη. Με πολλά παραδείγματα δείχνεται πώς ο Πλάτων σκόπιμα αλλάζει τη σημασία των λέξεων και με τη βοήθειά τους αναπτύσσει κεντρικούς όρους της φιλοσοφίας του.

3) Die Stadt im Spiegel der Descriptiones und Laudes urbium, Hildesheim 1980, <sup>2</sup>1986.

Συζητούνται παραδείγματα από τον Όμηρο έως τον 12<sup>ο</sup> αι. μ.Χ. epainōn πόλεων και καταδεικνύεται ότι πολλά γνωρίσματα, που αργότερα συνιστούνται από τα ρητορικά έγχειρίδια, απαντούν σταθερά μέσα στους αιώνες, ενώ άλλα είναι σχεδόν απόντα, για να εμφανιστούν τον 12<sup>ο</sup> αιώνα. Το βιβλίο δείχνει ότι η παράδοση συνεχίζει ουσιαστικά αμετάβλητη όχι μόνο σ' όλη την αρχαιότητα, αλλά και στον Μεσαίωνα στη Δύση και περισσότερο στην Ελληνική Ανατολή.

4) Recht-Rhetorik-Politik. Untersuchungen zu Ciceros rhetorischer Strategie, Darmstadt 1985· ιταλ. μτφρ: Diritto, retorica, politica, Bologna 1998.

Στο βιβλίο συζητούνται οι λόγοι Pro Cluentio, Pro Murena, Pro Flacco, De domo sua, De lege Manilla και De lege agraria I-III και αναλύεται η στρατηγική του ρήτορα, με ιδιαίτερη έμφαση στην επιλογή των θεμάτων, τη δομή της επιχειρηματολογίας και του λεξιλογίου, δείχνοντας ότι οι ίδιες τεχνικές χρησιμοποιούνται κατά διαφόρους τρόπους επιτυχώς στα δικαστήρια και στις δημόσιες συγκεντρώσεις, στη σύγκλητο και στην contio. Ό σ. καταδεικνύει πώς ο Κικέρων κάθε φορά προσαρμόζει τη στρατηγική του ανάλογα με τα ιδιαίτερα προβλήματα και το άκροατήριο, στο οποίο απευθύνεται, με σκοπό πάντοτε να πείσει το άκροατήριο κι όχι για να φτάσει στην αλήθεια.

5) Ansätze. Beiträge zum Verständnis der Frühgriechischen Philosophie, Würzburg 1986.

Συλλογή άρθρων, τα οποία αναφέρονται στην πρώιμη ελληνική φιλοσοφία: 1) Η απουσία της έννοιας του δημιουργού στην πρώιμη ελληνική σκέψη ανιχνεύεται και ταυτίζονται τα ουσιώδη χαρακτηριστικά της πλατωνικής δημιουργίας· 2) με προσεκτική ανάλυση των πηγών χρονολογικά αποδεικνύεται πώς η εικόνα του Θαλή και των ιδεών του μεταβάλλονται σταδιακά και ποιοι παράγοντες επηρέασαν αυτή την πορεία· 3-5) τρεις συμβολές αναφέρονται στη φιλοσοφία του Αναξίμανδρου: εξετάζονται κριτικά οι πηγές της και δίνεται μια πλήρης έκθεση των απόψεων του φιλοσόφου· ανάλυση των πηγών της έννοιας του άπειρου με έρμηνεία της και μια έκθεση της θεωρίας αλλαγής του Αναξίμανδρου σε σύγ-

κριση και με αντιπαράθεση με εκείνη του Άναξιμένη· 6) Ο ρόλος που παίζει η αντίθεση φωτός και σκότους στη σκέψη του Παρμενίδη, τόσο στην κοσμολογία του, όσο και στην ἐπιστημολογία, αντιπαράκειται πρὸς προηγούμενες θεωρίες· 7-9) τρία ἄρθρα ἀναφέρονται στους σοφιστές, τὸν τρόπο πὸς τοὺς παρουσιάζουν ὁ Ξενοφῶν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, με λιγότερη προκατάληψη ἀπὸ τὸν Πλάτωνα· ἐξέταση τῶν διαφόρων εἰδῶν ἐνδιαφέροντος καὶ γιὰ ἀτόψεις γιὰ τὴ γλώσσα τῶν Πρωταγόρα, Γοργία, Προδίκου καὶ Δημόκριτου καὶ πὼς τὴ χρησιμοποίησαν· 10) Ὁμοία ἐξέταση τοῦ τρόπου με τὸν ὁποῖο ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκμεταλλεύτηκε τὴ γλώσσα σύμφωνα με τὴς διαφορετικὲς ἐκδόσεις πὸς δίνουν ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης καὶ ὁ Ξενοφῶν· 11) Στὴν τελευταία συμβολὴ ἐξετάζονται προσωπικὰ οἱ ἀρχαῖες πηγές γιὰ τοὺς Κυρηναῖκους καὶ γίνεται προσπάθεια νὰ ξεχωριστῇ τὸ ἔργο πὸς μπορεῖ νὰ ἀποδοθεῖ στὸν Ἀρίστιππο ἀπὸ ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ἐγγονοῦ του.

6) Die Welt der Römer, Studien zu ihrer Litteratur, Geschichte, Religion, Berlin 1993.

Στὸν ἐντυπωσιακὸ αὐτὸ τόμο συγκεντρώθηκαν 13 ἄρθρα. Ἐκτὸς ἄλλων στὴ ρωμαϊκὴ λογοτεχνία ἀναφέρονται ἄρθρα γιὰ τὸν Ἐννιο, Λουκρήτιο, Καίσαρα, Κικέρωνα, Ὁράτιο, Ὀβίδιο, Μαρτιάλιο, Τάκιτο, Λουκίλιο.

7) Zur Litteratur und Gesellschaft der Römer, Stuttgart 1998.

Ὁ τόμος ἀποτελεῖ κατὰ κάποιον τρόπο συνέχεια τοῦ προηγούμενου. Στὴν καθαρὰ λογοτεχνία ἀναφέρονται συμβολές στὸν Κικέρωνα, Καίσαρα, Ὁράτιο, Τάκιτο, Τερτυλλιανὸ καὶ Ἀμμιανὸ Μαρκελλίνο. Ἀπὸ τὰ ὑπόλοιπα ἄρθρα τὸ τελευταῖο δίνει μιὰ κριτικὴ ἐκθεση τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς κλασσικῆς φιλολογίας στὴ Γερμανία ἀπὸ τὸ 1918-1988.

8) Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament, Tübingen 2000: Paperback Boston 2002.

Τὸ βιβλίο ἀσχολεῖται με μερικὲς πλευρὲς τῆς ἐφαρμογῆς ρητορικῶν κατηγοριῶν στὴν Καινὴ Διαθήκη, ὅπως διατυπώθηκαν πρόσφατα, καὶ ἄλλων πὸς παραμελήθηκαν. Τὸ μεγαλύτερο μέρος τοῦ ἔργου ἐξετάζει προσεκτικὰ τὸ λεξιλόγιο τοῦ Ἀποστόλου Παύλου, ἰδιαίτερα τοὺς ρητορικοὺς ὅρους. Τὸ τελευταῖο καὶ πῶς οὐσιαστικὸ κεφάλαιο ἀναφέρεται στὸν Μελάγχθωνα, στὸν τρόπο πὸς ἔκανε χρῆση τῶν ρητορικῶν κατηγοριῶν στὸ σχολιασμό του τῆς Βίβλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ κειμένων τῆς θύραθεν παιδείας.

9) Antike Rhetorik im Zeitalter des Humanismus, Leipzig/München 2003.

Τὸ βιβλίο ἀσχολεῖται με τὴν ὑποδοχὴ τῆς ἀρχαίας λογοτεχνίας στὴν ἐποχὴ

του Ανθρωπισμού. Τα κεφ. 1 και 2 συγκεντρώνονται στην έπιρροή του Κικέρωνα, στή γλώσσα, στή θεωρία του ύφους και τή λογοτεχνική πρακτική του 15ου και 16ου αι. στην Ίταλία, Γαλλία και Ίσπανία. Στή Γερμανία άφιερώνονται τὰ κεφ. V ως VII. Άλλες συμβολές είναι για τήν επίδραση του Κοϊντιλιανού, για τον Γεώργιο Τραπεζούντιο, σύγκριση για τήν έπιρροή Κικέρωνα και Σενέκα στή Γαλλία (κεφ. III, IV, V). Ένα έκτενές άρθρο άσχολείται και πάλι με τον Μελάγ-χθωνα και τις μεθόδους που άκολούθησε κλπ.

Το βιβλίο Zu Heinrich Bebel's Leben und Schriften, Göttingen 1997, όπως δηλώνει και ο τίτλος του, αναφέρεται στή ζωή και το αξιόλογο έργο του Bebel στο Πανεπιστήμιο του Tübingen. Τα τέσσερα βιβλία, που ο καθηγ. Classen έπιμελήθηκε, είναι:

1) *Sophistik Mit Einleitung* (1-18) και *Bibliographie* (641-709), Darmstadt 1976· ήταν μια αξιόλογη συμβολή στή μελέτη των σοφιστών εξαιτίας και της έκτενουσ βιβλιογραφίας που έκσυγχρονίστηκε το 1985.

2) *Die Klassische Altertumwissenschaft an der Georg-August-Universität-Göttingen* 1989. Συλλογή άρθρων που άνιχνεύουν τήν άνάπτυξη της Κλασσικής Φιλολογίας στο Πανεπιστήμιο της Γοτίγγης άπό τήν ίδρυσή του το 1737. Ο καθηγ. Classen έκθέτει τή ζωή και τή δράση του Kurt Latte, καθηγητή του Πανεπιστημίου αυτού άπό το 1931-35 και 1945-50, καθώς και τήν περίοδο διώξης του Latte άπό τους Ναζί.

3) *Rhetorica* (1989). Πρόκειται για ένα κατάλογο έγχειριδίων, αρχαίων κειμένων με ύπομνήματα και έργα νεώτερων λογίων, που δημοσιεύτηκε με τήν εύκαιρία της 7ης συνόδου της διεθνούς ένωσης για τήν ιστορία της ρητορικής.

4) *Die Macht des Wortes* (1992)· συλλογή όμιλιών στή Γοτίγγη σε διάφορες πλευρές της ιστορίας της ρητορικής. Η συμβολή του καθηγ. Classen αναφέρεται στή χρήση σήμερα της ρητορικής κυρίως στην πολιτική.

Η αξιόλογη άπό κάθε άποψη σταδιοδρομία του καθηγ. κ. Classen στις κλασσικές σπουδές, ή έπιρροή που άσκησε παγκόσμια στα θέματα αυτά και ή εύμενής στάση του άπέναντι στην Ελλάδα τον όδήγησαν επάξια στο αξίωμα του άντεπιστέλλοντος μέλους της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών.

Στήν ύπόλοιπη σταδιοδρομία του του εύχομαι πολλά εύτυχήματα επ' άγα-θω της έπιστήμης και του άνθρωπισμού που τόσο έπιτυχώς καλλιεργεί.



## THUCYDIDES ON POLITICIANS AND POLEIS

*In memoriam proavi**Ioannis Classen*

1805-1891

CARL JOACHIM CLASSEN

It is a great honour and a very special privilege to have been elected corresponding member of the Academy in Athens, and I should like to express my profound gratitude to you, Mr. President, and to all members for this generous gift. The Akadimia Athinon not only takes its name from Plato's Academy, but it has also its seat in the very city where Plato lived and worked and from where his ideas have influenced European philosophy, our ways of thinking and especially our moral standards and values. Indeed, in his Republic Plato establishes a group of virtues which to him constitute the elements of "perfect goodness" (ἀρετή), "wisdom" (σοφία), "courage" (ἀνδρεία), "temperance" (σωφροσύνη) and "justice" (δικαιοσύνη). These four were later accepted by the Stoics as the main virtues, in rhetoric they served as basis for all encomia, and St Ambrose, the bishop of Milan, honoured them by calling them "*virtutes cardinales*", and as cardinal virtues they played an important role not only in moral thought throughout the centuries, but also in various forms of art, painting and sculpture. But where do they have their roots, were they first singled out by Plato, did this group have any predecessors?

When in Homer's Iliad a father advises his son "always to be the best and superior to the others" (VI 208; XI 784: αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπεύροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων), he gives no further details as regards the particular aspects of excellence he has in mind, while other passages point to two areas of excellence only: "to be an (accomplished) speaker of words and doer of (memorable) deeds" (IX 443: μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμμεναι περικτῆρὰ τε ἔργων). The "battle ground" (μάχη) and "the assembly" (βουλή) are the two areas where "excellence" (ἀρετή) is expected and valued. Several centuries later, Pindar is still vague when he merely talks of four virtues without naming them in the third Nemean ode

(74-75: ἐλᾷ δὲ καὶ τέσσαρας ἀρετάς / <ὁ> θνατὸς αἰὼν, φρονεῖν δ' ἐνέπει τὸ παρ-  
κείμενον); and only once he may be alluding to the Platonic group when in  
the eighth Isthmian ode he first describes Aeacus as "having settled disputes"  
(probably amongst the gods: δίκας ἐπεύρανε), then "his sons being godlike and  
their descendants being war loving, both as excelling with courage in devot-  
ing themselves to fighting and as being σώφρονες and intelligent" (24-26: τοῦ  
μὲν ἀντίδου / ἀρίστευον νιέες νιέων τ' ἀρηίφιλοι παῖδες ἀνορέα / γάλλεον σπονό-  
εντ' ἀμφίπειν ὅμαδον, / σώφρονές τ' ἐγένοντο πινυτοί τε θυμόν). One may, of  
course, find the four virtues here to which Plato gave special prominence, but  
only if one understands σώφρονες not in the sense in which it is used in early  
Greek (i. e. "sagacious", "prudent"), but as "moderate, temperate", i. e. as it is  
elsewhere familiar from Attic Greek only.

That the group of four virtues was not firmly established at the time seems  
clear to me from the often quoted line from Aeschylus' Septem against Thebes  
where the poet makes Eteocles praise Amphiaras as "a temperate, just, good  
(brave) and pious man" (610: σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβὴς ἀνὴρ), with  
"wise" (σοφός) obviously missing. When one interprets εὐσεβὴς as "wise"<sup>1</sup> one  
overlooks the fact that even later the two, σοφός and εὐσεβής (or rather ὅσιος)  
are clearly distinguished and used side by side, making up a group of five (see  
e. g. Plat. Prt. 330 B; 349 B). Indeed in Plato's dialogues one finds more than  
once similar, but larger groups of virtues, in the Meno, in the Phaedo, in the  
Republic and elsewhere, as also in other authors, e. g. in Euripides (Autoly-  
cus frg. 282 with the addition of eloquence), in Xenophon's life of Agesilaus  
(with wisdom being omitted as in Pindar, but not only piety being added, but  
also love of one's own city and other qualities) or in Xenophon's Memorabilia  
where courage is omitted, but piety, selfsufficiency, eloquence and others are  
mentioned (IV 8, 11), or in Isocrates' encomium of Euagoras who begins with  
outward qualities such as beauty and bodily strength (22-23).

The questions I wish to ask and answer here is which categories Thucy-  
dides makes use of in judging prominent people or whole cities, and to what  
extent he may have influenced Plato's thinking. I begin with the characteri-  
zations of Themistocles and Pausanias.<sup>2</sup> Thucydides introduces the Spartan

1. See M. Bowra, Pindar, Oxford 1964, 181.

2. Editions used: K. W. Krüger (ed.), ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΗ (later ΞΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΗ),



Pausanias in the usual manner: "Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus from Lacedaemon" (I 94, 1: Παισανίας δὲ ὁ Κλεομβρότου ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνων), and a little later he continues as if giving merely some further factual information on his position: "Since he was oppressive, the other Greeks became offended" (I 95, 1: βιαίου ὄντος αὐτοῦ οἱ τε ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἤχθοντο<sup>3</sup>). He reports further that in Sparta Pausanias was accused of "great injustice" and "a conduct rather like the imitation of tyranny than a military command" (I 95, 3: ἀδικία πολλή and τυραννίδος μᾶλλον ... μίμησις ἢ στρατηγία), also of "wrongs done to certain individuals" and "medism", "sympathy with the Persians" (I 95, 5: ἀδικήματα and μηδισμός).

Later Thucydides characterizes Pausanias at greater length, primarily emphasizing that he, though recognized on account of his merits, himself refused to behave in the same way as all other people (I 130, 1). He points out that Pausanias preferred a style of life being different from everybody else's (I 132,

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Berlin (K. W. Krüger) I - II 1846-1847; I<sup>2</sup> and II<sup>2</sup> 1855-1861; I 1<sup>3</sup> 1860; J. Classen (ed.), Thucydides I<sup>2</sup>-VIII<sup>2</sup>, Berlin (Weidmann) 1871-1885 (editor's personal copy); E. F. Pörrö and I. M. Stahl (edd.), Thucydides de bello Peloponnesiaco libri octo, Leipzig (Teubner) I<sup>3</sup> 1886-1889; II<sup>2</sup>-IV<sup>2</sup> 1875-1883; J. Classen - J. Steup (edd.), Thucydides I<sup>5</sup>-II<sup>5</sup> and III<sup>3</sup>-VIII<sup>3</sup>, Berlin (Weidmann) 1892-1922; C. Hude (ed.), Thucydides Historiae I-II, Leipzig (Teubner) 1898-1901; C. Hude (ed.), Thucydides Historiae I<sup>2</sup>-II, Leipzig (Teubner) 1901-1913; H. St. Jones and J. E. Powell (edd.), Thucydides Historiae I<sup>2</sup>-II<sup>2</sup>, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1942; O. Luschkat (ed.), Thucydides Historiae I-II<sup>2</sup>, Leipzig (Teubner) 1960; J. de Romilly (ed.), Thucydide. La Guerre du Péloponnèse I<sup>3</sup>; II-V, VI and VII<sup>2</sup>; VIII (III and VIII with R. Weil), Paris (Les Belles Lettres), 1962-1972; I. B. Alberti (ed.), Thucydides Historiae I-III, Rome (Istituto Poligrafico) 1972-2000; commentaries consulted: A. W. Gomme, A. Andrews, K. J. Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides I-V, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1945-1981; S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides I-II (Books I-III and IV-V.24), Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1991-1996; on particular books: J. S. Rusten (ed.), Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War Book II, Cambridge (University Press) 1989; T. R. Mills (ed.), Thucydides Histories Book IV, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1909; K. J. Dover (ed.), Thucydides Book VI, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1965; K. J. Dover (ed.), Thucydides Book VII, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1965; see also C. Hude (ed.), Scholia in Thucydidem, Leipzig (Teubner) 1927 and M. H. N. von Essen, Index Thucydideus, Berlin (Weidmann) 1887.

3. Scholars disagree on where this sentence begins but not on the text here quoted.

2: παρανομία<sup>4</sup>) and speaks of his “imitation of the barbarians” (I 132, 2: ζήλωσις τῶν βαρβάρων). This makes the Lacedaemonians suspect (as Thucydides emphasizes) that “he was not content with being in his present position” (I 132, 2: μὴ ἴσος βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοῖς παροῦσι). They also examine “whether he had in any respect changed his way of life away from the established norms” (I 132, 2: εἴ τί που ἐξεδεδιήτητο τῶν καθεστώτων νομίμων); and they regard as “wrong” (I 132, 3: ἀδίκημα) the elegiac couplet which Pausanias inscribed on the tripod in Delphi in which he called himself “leader” of the Greeks (ἀρχηγός) and conqueror of the Persians. What is criticized - according to Thucydides - is not that Pausanias violated written laws or generally accepted ethical principles, but disregarded unwritten rules of the political life.

In judging Themistocles Thucydides stresses his intellectual powers, beginning with the impression he made on the Persians as being “intelligent” or “prudent” (I 138, 2: ξυνετός); and he continues himself in a similar way, saying he was “a man who showed the power of his talents in the most reliable manner” (I 138, 3: βεβαίωτατα δὲ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας) and pointing out that “by means of his native sagacity and without either earlier or later study of an issue he was the best judge in cases of emergency — merely with the help of very brief deliberation (βουλῇ) and also most able to divine what was likely to happen for the longest period of time in future” (I 138, 3: οἰκεία γὰρ ξυνέσει καὶ οὕτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἐπιμαθὼν, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι’ ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής<sup>5</sup>). Furthermore Thucydides stresses that whatever Themistocles had in hand he was “able to explain” (ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε), and even where he had no experience he did not fail “to judge with competence” (I 138, 3: κρῖναι ἱκανῶς). In adding “he foresaw what was better or worse with regard to what was still in the dark” (τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χειρόν ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ προεώρα μάλιστα) Thucydides uses τὸ ἄμεινον ἢ χειρόν not referring to moral

4. Here the scholiasts paraphrase τῇ τε παρανομίᾳ διὰ τὸ μὴ στέργειν τοῖς Λακωνικοῖς νόμοις und ἐξεδεδιήτητο ἔξω τῶν Λακωνικῶν διητὰτο νόμων, cf. C. Hude (ed.), Scholia in Thucydidem, 1927, 96.

5. The scholiasts explain οἰκεία γὰρ ξυνέσει φύσιν or ἄνευ μαθήσεως τὴν ξύνεσιν and in the following sentence τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χειρόν τὸ συνοῖσον ἢ τὸ βλαπτικόν, cf. C. Hude (ed.), Scholia in Thucydidem, 1927, 101.

standards, but to political aspects (i. e. to what is beneficial or not for the city); and in the same way one has to understand τὰ δέοντα (“the right thing to be done”: I 138, 3) in the following summary: In short, what Thucydides praises in Themistocles is natural talents, foresight and the ability quickly to understand, judge, decide and explain especially in matters that concern the city, the welfare of the other citizens, whereas he does not mention or praise such virtues as bravery or justice or fairness or modesty or clemency.

Now the question arises whether and where the same qualities which occur in the characterizations of Themistocles and Pausanias are ascribed by Thucydides to any of the other more or less important people he talks about or whether he chooses other virtues or vices. The first striking observation is that Thucydides hardly ever gives a character sketch either when mentioning a person for the first time or after his death in a kind of necrology. And even where he characterizes an individual he very often does so in a very brief manner. He seems, in particular, inclined to limit himself to remarks on someone's role in public life and the qualities shown while active in politics or in the service of the community, the country or the polis.

Thus, to Archelaus, the Macedonian king, he ascribes administrative achievements only (II 100, 2). In a similar brief manner Athenagoras is mentioned merely as “leader of the people” and no more is described than his relationship with the citizens of Syracuse, i. e. he is said to be “more than anyone else at that time capable to persuade the masses” (VI 35, 2: δῆμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς<sup>6</sup>). For the Athenian Aristogiton Thucydides uses the phrase “a man of the town's people, a citizen of the middle class” (VI 54, 2: ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀστών, μέσος πολίτης), that is he gives his social and political status only while of Kylon he speaks first of his victory in the Olympic games and his noble birth before pointing to his political influence in very general terms (I 126, 3: δυνατός<sup>7</sup>). Similarly Theseus is characterized as powerful; but in his case Thucydides says “having in addition to being

6. Πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς is paraphrased by the scholiasts as δυνάμενος πείθειν τοὺς πολλούς, cf. C. Hude (ed.), Scholia in Thucydidem, 1927, 346.

7. Both here and in the previous case the scholiasts give other interpretations: on VI 54, 2: μέσος: οὔτε ἐπιφανής οὔτε ἄδοξος and in I 126, 3: δυνατός: πλούσιος, cf. C. Hude (ed.), Scholia in Thucydidem, 1927, 352 and 92.



intelligent also become powerful” (γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατός: II 15, 2). More clearly he describes Theramenes as a man “not unable to speak or to judge” (ἀνὴρ οὔτε εἰπεῖν οὔτε γνῶναι ἀδύνατος<sup>8</sup>) after introducing him as “son of Hagno” and as “(one of) the leading figures amongst those who caused the fall of the democracy” (Θηραμένης ὁ τοῦ Ἄγωνος ἐν τοῖς ξυγκαταλύουσι τὸν δῆμον πρῶτος ἦν: VIII 68, 4). In brief, it is again the political activities and the services for the polis, the special position in the city of an individual on which Thucydides focusses his interest.

This is also demonstrated by his characterization of Phrynichus a little later in the same chapter: “Phrynichus, too, showed outstandingly amongst all by far the greatest eagerness towards oligarchy ... and after agreeing to support it, he appeared to be most trustworthy with regards to all dangers” - dangers referring here to the real dangers of the plans of the Four Hundred (VIII 68, 3: παρέσχε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἑαυτὸν πάντων διαφερόντως προθυμότεον ἐς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν and πολὺ τε πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ, ἐπειδὴ περ ὑπέστη, φερεγγυώτατος ἐφά- νη). It should not be overlooked that Thucydides passes his judgment here and not earlier where he mentions Phrynichus for the first time (VIII 25, 1) or where he describes his activities as general a little later (VIII 27, 2). There he merely says that he preferred acting cautiously on the basis of “exact knowledge” (σαφῶς εἰδέναι) and “careful preparations made without haste” (ἱκανῶς καὶ κατ’ ἥσυχίαν παρασκευάζεσθαι) to “foolishly running all risks” (ἀλόγως διακινδυνεύειν) for fear of “disgrace” (τὸ αἰσχροῦν). For, Thucydides adds (VIII 27, 3), it would not be disgraceful (for the Athenians) in the eyes of Phrynichus to retreat with the fleet “when it is required by circumstances” (μετὰ καιροῦ), but it would be “more disgraceful” (αἴσχιον), if they suffered defeat in any manner; for that would bring about “disgrace and the greatest danger” (τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ὁ μέγιστος κίνδυνος). Clearly, for him “disgrace” (used here several times), depends not on absolute standards, courage or cowardice, resistance at all cost or retreat, but on what benefits the city, on what is useful for the polis. As consequence of his attitude, of such views Phrynichus gains the reputation of being “not without intelligence” (οὐκ ἄξύνετος: VIII 27, 5). Such a judgment when passed by the fellow-citizens referred not least to political insight

8. The phrase is very similar to the one he had used a little earlier for Antipho: VIII 68, 1.

also. It is the welfare of the city which - according to Thucydides — is for Phrynichus the factor that makes him warn against internal strife (στασιά-  
ζειν) and condemn the so-called “brave and fair” (οἱ καλοὶ καγαθοὶ ὀνομαζό-  
μενοι<sup>9</sup>), for they feel - in his view - concerned about their own advantage only  
and would not refrain from any form of injustice; on the people, however, he  
passes a more favourable judgment; for he regards them as capable of “keeping  
the others in bounds” (ἐκείνων σωφρονιστής: VIII 48, 4-6).

No less important is Thucydides’ account of Nicias. After his death he is  
characterized briefly as someone of whom “all efforts were directed towards  
ἀρετῇ in accordance with custom and tradition” (διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν  
νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν: VII 86, 5<sup>10</sup>), that is efforts to prove to be an ἀνὴρ  
ἀγαθός, “a good man”, possessing all good qualities. However, a little ear-  
lier Thucydides speaks of Nicias’ reaction to the lunar eclipse on account of  
which he decides not to leave Syracuse and he criticizes him as “also a little  
too devoted to religious practices and suchlike” (τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ  
τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος: VII 50, 4). This is a remark on a particular person,  
made without implying a general view, positive or negative, on piety or reli-  
gious practices. In other passages he underlines that Nicias was esteemed on  
account of his military achievements while at the same time always striving  
for peace and endeavoring to end all trouble for the people and himself, to  
maintain his own εὐτυχία, i. e. both his own “good luck” and his “well-being”,  
and to add to his own glory, that for him is the glory of never having done  
any harm to the city, believing, as Thucydides adds, that this could happen “if  
one avoided danger” (ἐκ ἀκινδύνου) and did not give oneself into the hands of  
Tyche, of Fate, and that “peace brings about the absence of danger” (again τὸ  
ἀκίνδυνον: V 16, 1).

Of the Syracusan Hermocrates Thucydides says that “he was a man sec-

9. The translation is that of A. W. Gomme: in A. W. Gomme, A. Andrews, K. J. Dover,  
A Historical Commentary on Thucydides III, 1956, 480.

10. On this controversial sentence - for the readings of the codices see C. Hude (ed.),  
Thucydidis Historiae II, 1901, 214 — one should not overlook the scholiasts’ comments:  
διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν. διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν νομίμως ἐπιτετηδεύ-  
κεναι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε νενομισμένην ἀρετὴν τὴν δοκοῦσαν λέγει, cf. C. Hude (ed.), Scholia in  
Thucydidem, 1927, 406.

ond to no one with respect to intelligence in all other fields and with regard to warfare he had proved competent due to his experience and distinguished with regard to bravery” (ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐς τὰλλα ξύνεσιν οὐδενὸς λειπόμενος καὶ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρία τε ἱκανὸς γενόμενος καὶ ἀνδρεία ἐπιφάνης: VI 72, 2): he combined natural talents and proofs of intelligence with courage. On the basis of this Thucydides makes him assure the Syracusians that “fortitude would be even more courageous than itself when connected with confidence in (one’s own) knowledge” ([and experience]: τὴν δ’ εὐψυχίαν αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς μετὰ τοῦ πιστοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης θαρσαλεωτέραν ἔσσεσθαι: VI 72, 4<sup>11</sup>). And it is in this manner that Hermocrates is described in the whole account of his activities as thinking and devising independently and even acting without waiting for the consent of the others, as headstrong for which reason he is finally sent into exile. Here it becomes very obvious that it is the fellow citizens who determine what one might even call the standards, and that Thucydides tends to speak of such talents as foresight and ability quickly to understand, to judge, to decide, also to expound one’s views, and not so much of bravery and justice, fairness, modesty and clemency.

Time does not allow me to speak of all examples which would be interesting in this context. But two great men must not be omitted here whom Thucydides considers to be particularly important, Pericles and Brasidas. Brasidas appears first in the second and third books, but it is only in the fourth book in connection with the expedition to Thrace and the long speech Thucydides makes him address to his soldiers that he characterizes the Spartan general at some length (IV 81, 1). He begins by pointing not to this or that quality, but to the initiative and activity which he had shown and of which he had given more than one proof already, referring to the reputation he enjoyed in Sparta where he was respected for his “great energy with regard to all matters” (IV 81, 1: δραστήριος ἐς τὰ πάντα) - perhaps with the undertone of rather too active. However, to other Greeks he appeared to be “just and moderate” (IV 81, 2: δίκαιος καὶ μέτριος); and Thucydides emphasizes the latter virtue by apply-

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11. The scholiasts explain μετὰ τοῦ πιστοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης: μετὰ τοῦ πεποινθέναι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, cf. C. Hude (ed.), Scholia in Thucydidem, 1927, 359.



ing μέτριος several times to Brasidas and his actions (here<sup>12</sup> and elsewhere in the fourth book).

Earlier he emphasizes his ability to act or react “with speed” (IV 70, 1: κατὰ τάχος) or “without being discovered” (IV 70, 2: ἔκπυστος), his courage (IV 11, 4), his insight and his experience which made him proceed with care and caution, e. g. in order to be admitted into Megara (IV 71-73), also his inclination towards fairness and peaceful settlements (IV 73, 1-3), later his justice (IV 83, 3), his “clemency” (IV 108, 3: πραότης), his piety (IV 116, 2) and even his eloquence: “He was not unable to speak, not a bad speaker” - at least, as the Athenian Thucydides adds sarcastically - “at least for a Lacedaemonian” (IV 84, 2: οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὥς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰπεῖν). However, Thucydides fully recognizes his merits; for he remarks that after the Sicilian expedition the reputation of Brasidas’ “honourable conduct<sup>13</sup> and intelligence” (ἀρετὴ καὶ ξύνεσις) still made many Greeks turn away from the Athenians to the Spartans; and he adds that Brasidas was “known to be excellent in all respects” (δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθός: IV 81, 3), and that he was the first who going abroad and gaining a good reputation made a lasting impression on the others, especially in Thrace, and thus caused them to expect all Lacedaemonians to be like him.

Pericles is characterized by Thucydides soon after first being mentioned as “the most powerful man amongst his contemporaries and leading the state” (I 127, 3: δυνατώτατος τῶν καὶ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν), i. e. with regard to his position in public life. And Thucydides takes this up a little later with the words “at that time the first man of the Athenians and most powerful with regard to speech and action” (I 139, 4: ἀνὴρ καὶ’ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον πρωτότος Ἀθηναίων λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος), words which remind one at once of Homer’s ideal quoted above (Iliad IX 443: μύθων τε ῥητῆρ’ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων). One cannot fail here seeing and being impressed by the continuity of the ideals and standards of the Greeks. In describing Pericles’ military activities, Thucydides emphasizes the speed with which he acts (I 114, 1) as he did with regard to Brasidas — speed, incidentally, being a qual-

12. The scholiasts’ interpretation ταπεινός is quite wrong, cf. G. Hude (ed.), Scholia in Thucydidem, 1927, 268.

13. See S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides I-II (see note 2) II, 1996, 272.

ity also often stressed later, e. g. by Cicero with regard to Pompey or by the Latin panegyrists when praising Roman emperors.<sup>14</sup> But at first Thucydides seems reluctant to judge Pericles; he describes him briefly as intransigent towards the Spartans (II 12), very cautious with regard to his own compatriots in order not to be suspected of being a traitor (II 13, 1-2), and generally as intelligent, prudent and circumspect.

It is only after Pericles' death that Thucydides gives a fuller account in his necrology which reveals the numerous aspects which our historian regards as relevant for the evaluation of a great man. As in his characterization of Brasidas which Thucydides begins by pointing out his usefulness for the Lacedaemonians with the words: "having become most useful for the Lacedaemonians" (IV 81,1: *πλείστου ἄξιον Λακεδαιμονίοις γενόμενον*), in his final assessment of Pericles he emphasizes at the beginning that the Athenians regarded him as "most valuable for the needs of the whole city" (II 65, 4: *ὧν δὲ ἡ ἑύμπεσσα πόλις προσεδεῖτο πλείστου ἄξιον νομίζοντες εἶναι*). And in words similar to those he used in describing Brasidas' behaviour as just and moderate (*δίκαιος* and *μέτριος*) here he says of Pericles: "He governed the city with moderation and thus kept it in safety" (II 65, 5: *μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφάλῳς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν*). Obviously, Pericles is recognized - according to Thucydides because he guaranteed greatness and safety of the city through his "foresight", his "prudence" (*πρόνοια*: II 65, 6). There can be no doubt that the categories which Thucydides is applying here are political. In the necrology that follows he speaks of peace and restraint with regard to foreign affairs with the aim of safety. And in mentioning the fateful elements of the policy of Pericles' successors who acted contrary to Pericles' principles and were led by different motives such as "personal ambition" and "personal greediness" (both in plural: *ιδίαι φιλοτιμίαι* and *ἴδια κέρδη*: II 65, 7) he implies qualities of Pericles which he also names explicitly in the following sentence: "superior judgment" (II 65, 8: *γνώμη*) and integrity (being *ἀδωρότατος*) which led to general respect and enabled him to "control the masses in a free spirit" (almost an oxymoron: *κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως*: II 65, 8). For he could act freely, i. e. without feeling any obligation to anyone (e. g. on account of bribery or other benefits).

14. Cic. Manil. 29; 30; 34-35; 40; see also 13; 33 and Paneg. 8, 6, 1; 12, 15, 3, also 10, 6,4 and in general 5, 10.

This is what the following sentence, duly famous, means to convey: “He was not more led by the masses than that he guided them” (II 65, 8: *καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μάλλον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἡγεῖν*). For, as Thucydides continues, Pericles owed his position not to improper or dishonest factors and could express his views freely, and not in order to give pleasure to them (i. e. the masses: II 65, 8).

Thucydides judges Pericles as politician here, his position and the nature of his power, and in Athens this means judgment of what the politician says in public and what he risks to say. What Thucydides thinks of becomes even more obvious where he talks of the mistakes of those with whom Pericles disagreed or who influenced Athenian politics later, those (as he says II 65, 9) who out of insolence showed too much confidence “at the wrong time” (*παρὰ καιρὸν*) or without reason too much fear. Furthermore he mentions as wrong actions or attitudes “to leave affairs to the whims of the people” (II 65, 10: *καθ’ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι*) or not to decide “what is due” (II 65, 11: *τὰ πρόσφορα*), “personal intrigues” (*ἰδίαι διαβολαί*) and “internal quarrels” (II 65, 12: *ἰδίαι διαφοραί*). In short, what Pericles’ opponents and successors lack (and what he himself has) is on the one hand adequate consideration of all factors of an issue and recognition of what is fitting, appropriate and necessary in any particular situation and on the other hand regard and respect for the community and the rights of others vis-à-vis one’s own advantages.

The last question I shall try to answer is how Thucydides makes individuals judge cities, what is it that he makes Archidamus say about Sparta and Pericles about Athens? In describing the way of life and the political practices to which Sparta owes her freedom and fame (I 80-85, 2) Archidamus speaks of “wise moderation” (I 84, 2: *σωφροσύνη ἔμψρων*<sup>15</sup>) the various aspects of which he alludes to in the account that follows: “We alone do not become insolent in prosperity and in adversity we give in less easily than others” (I 84, 2: *μόνοι γὰρ δι’ αὐτὸ εὐπραγίαις τε οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν καὶ ξυμφοραῖς ἥσσον ἐτέρων εἵκομεν*) and “when people excite us with praise, we do not allow ourselves to be carried away by pleasure against our judgment and when someone provokes us by

15. The scholiasts comment: *σωφροσύνη ἔμψρων· σωφροσύνην ἔμψρωνα λέγει τὴν μετὰ λογισμοῦ τυγχάνουσιν, οὐ τὴν ἀλόγιστον καὶ ἀπὸ φύσεως μόνον συμβαίνουσιν*, cf. C. Hude (ed.), *Scholia in Thucydidem*, 1927, 67.



an accusation we are not more impressed and persuaded" (τῶν τε ξὺν ἐπαίνῳ ἐξοτρυνόντων ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐπαιρόμεθα ἡδονῇ, καὶ ἢν τις ἄρα ξὺν κατηγορίᾳ παροξύνη, οὐδὲν δὲ μᾶλλον ἀχθεσθέντες ἀνεπέισθημεν) — all this in sentences carefully construed in parallels and phrased personally ("we") in order to emphasize the difference from all others.

I cannot present and consider all details here - suffice it to stress that Archidamus speaks of the Spartans (on account of the good order of the whole state, i. e. it being εὐκοσμος) as being "courageous and wise in counsel" (πολεμικοὶ τε καὶ εὐβουλοὶ), thus again echoing the Homeric ideal referred to twice before (Iliad IX 443). And he points as part of "moderation" (σωφροσύνη) to αἰδώς ("a proper sense of shame") and as part of αἰσχύνη ("shame") to "courage" (εὐψυχία) - to put it differently: From moderation results shame, from shame courage. And the "right judgment" (εὐβουλία) is the result of an education based on moderation and on standards not so high (i. e. not so sophisticated) as to allow "us" (he says) to ignore laws (I 84, 3<sup>16</sup>). On the basis of his long experience Archidamus continues to characterize the Lacedaemonians in obvious contrast to what he believes the Athenians do, claiming that the Spartans do not censure the preparations of their enemies "nicely with perfect reasoning" (λόγῳ καλῶς: I 84, 3) and then fail to follow this up by adequate action. And he continues "that we think that our neighbours' mind and thoughts are similar to our own and that fortune cannot be analysed by reasoning" (I 84, 3: νομίζειν δὲ τάς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι καὶ τάς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς). Summing up he states one should assume that "one man does not differ much from another, but he is best who is educated in what is most necessary, i. e. taught in the essential virtues" (I 84, 4: πολὺ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται).

Thucydides makes Archidamus start from "moderation" (σωφροσύνη) and emphasizes this element throughout, going on to respect for others ("no insolence": οὐκ ἐξυβρίζειν) and to "good order" (εὐκοσμος), "courage" (or

16. Cf. εὐβουλοὶ δὲ ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν with the scholiasts comment: ἡμεῖς οὖν, φησί, παιδευόμεθα ἀμαθῶς ἔχον τοῦ καταφρονεῖν τῶν νόμων, τουτέστιν οὐ παιδευόμεθα ὥστε ὑπερορᾶν τῶν νόμων, cf. C. Hude (ed.), Scholia in Thucydidem, 1927, 67.

“bravery”: εὐψυχία) and “right judgment” (εὐβουλία) combined with respect for law and order<sup>17</sup>. Without wishing to press details I venture to suggest that it is here - if anywhere - that the four cardinal virtues are foreshadowed which Plato later singles out and which formed the basis of ethical thinking in Europe for centuries (as indicated in the introduction): “moderation” (σωφροσύνη), “courage” (ἀνδρεία, here: “bravery”: εὐψυχία), “justice” (δικαιοσύνη, here respect for the laws) and “insight”, “wisdom” (φρόνησις, here “right judgment and foresight”: εὐβουλία): Whether one agrees with this suggestion or not, what matters is, I think, that Thucydides sets out from σωφροσύνη which he regards as basic, cautions against too subtle knowledge and emphasizes the importance of actions.

Pericles, on the other hand, is made by Thucydides to outline some general principles of policy at the end of his first speech (I 140-144), warning against “extending the empire while at war and against bringing upon oneself self-inflicted dangers” (I 144, 1: ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐπικταῖσθαι ἅμα πολέμουντες καὶ κινδύνους ἀνδαιρέτους μὴ προσπίθεσθαι), thereby recommending moderation, and then justice by stating willingness “to offer arbitration according to the treaty” (I 144, 2: δίκας ... δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας). In the following sentences he speaks of the Athenians’ readiness for combat and loyalty towards their ancestors. Thus, in addition to moderation, sense of justice, insight and courage Pericles here stresses the obligation to their tradition, the Athenian tradition, to their ancestors and to their moral standards.

What Thucydides regards as characteristic features of Athens is more clearly brought out by Pericles in his funeral speech (II 35-46). First he stresses as essential elements freedom and equality; and justice, not moderation appears to be the foundation. Surprisingly, he continues to speak not of education or learning, but of various forms of relaxation, “private pleasure” (II 38, 1: τέρψις) and enjoyment of their own and of foreign goods (II 38, 2: ἀπόλαυσις), further of their more “relaxed and easy going way of life” (II 39, 1: ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι, see also II 39, 4: ῥαθυμία). Next he offers another surprise; for using a new word (φιλοκαλοῦμεν) he says: “We value what is worth striving for without extravagance and we strive eagerly without loss of vigour

17. See the scholiasts remarks on πολέμικοι τε καὶ εὐβούλοι: C. Hude (ed.), Scholia in Thucydidem, 1927, 67.

for learning, for knowledge" (II 40, 1: φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφούμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας) - a sentence which is difficult to do justice to in view of its complexity, as it is to the whole speech. Here and later in the last speech Thucydides makes Pericles speak as a politician, not theoretically analysing the factors which should determine the activities of cities, but as a politician giving advice in a particular situation in view of actual dangers; and for this reason he stresses courage and bravery, based on insight (II 62, 5), insists on activity and emphasizes that the existence of the whole Athenian empire is at stake.

The small selection of passages to which I had to confine myself and which I had to discuss rather briefly here, justifies, I think, the following conclusions: For Thucydides ἀρετὴ does not denote a man's excellence or prowess, as in Homer's poems, but mostly a more limited quality an essential element of which is respect for others, readiness to waive one's own claims, to adjust oneself to the community, to the polis. And while Homer portrays his heroes not only as aiming at being honoured as individuals by the group or society to which they belong, but striving both for personal recognition by their enemies and personal fame amongst later generations, without the poet characterizing anyone as a perfect ideal, Thucydides when describing great personalities stresses what is related to their political activities; and where he mentions more personal matters, it is only in so far as they are somehow connected with public life. Only where he makes others speak of their poleis and all their citizens the historian feels less restricted by factual details and free to generalize and to confine himself to a few basic virtues. Thus one finds Archidamus and Pericles in their respective accounts of Sparta and Athens underlining the importance of moderation and justice, also of courage and knowledge - together with training and education, and in this, I would argue, Thucydides is foreshadowing Plato as he selects these four virtues and relates them to the context of the life of a city (leaving it to Aristotle to discuss them theoretically and present a fully developed system). I would maintain, therefore, that in trying to understand Greek ethics and its history one is well advised not ignore Thucydides' Histories.

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